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a b s t r a c t
The Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) faces a perfect storm. It is squeezed
between the revolution in unconventionals, which has increased global supply of hydrocarbons and
lowered their price, and the prospect of a global peak in oil demand, stemming from climate policies and
the falling costs of alternative energy technologies. In the face of these challenges, media commentators
have declared the death of OPEC as a cartel. This perspective argues that the claims about OPEC’s demise
are misguided for four reasons: (1) OPEC never acted as a cartel, let alone a powerful one; (2) thanks to
its cheap production costs, OPEC’s oil will remain competitive in a low-cost environment; (3) the group
has always proved to be flexible; and (4) OPEC is still attractive to its member states, most notably as a
source of prestige, as is illustrated by the recent re-entries of Indonesia and Gabon. That said, over the
longer term OPEC will inevitably need to adapt to a changing external environment. A likely possibility
would be for the club to gradually morph from an output-setting cartel into a forum for deliberation and
information-sharing.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
OPEC is facing some of the most severe threats in its almost 60-
year history. The ‘fracking revolution’ has unlocked large swaths
of new oil and gas supplies, contributing to a global glut. Alterna-
tive energy technologies are seeing impressive falls in costs—with
solar photovoltaics prices dropping more than 60% between 2009
and 2016 [1]. A new climate treaty was adopted by 195 nations in
December 2015, aiming to limit climate change to ‘well below’ 2 ◦C,
which would render the bulk of fossil fuel reserves ‘unburnable’
[2]. On top of that, the dramatic fall in oil prices since mid-2014,
after a four-year period of relatively stable and high prices, has
exposed the economic fragility of many OPEC countries who are
heavily reliant on revenues from the foreign sales of crude oil, most
notably Venezuela, which saw its economy shrink by 5.7% in 2015
[3].
The self-proclaimed cartel has failed to adopt a coherent, united
stance in response to these colluding challenges. At a dramatic
meeting inNovember 2014, OPEC defied expectations that itwould
cut supply and shore up the price, opting instead to let market
forces play out. OPEChad an official production ceiling of 30million
barrels a day (mb/d) since 2012 [4], but the target was effectively
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abandoned in December 2015 when the group ended its semi-
annual meeting without specifying new production quotas [5].
OPEC’s inaction in 2014 stands in stark contrast to its response
to the oil price crashes of 1998 and 2008, when the organization
orchestrated major production cutbacks. The decision not to lower
the production quotas in November 2014 is largely attributed to
Saudi Arabia and its main concern that any cut in its production
would have been offset by an increase in production from within
and outside OPEC, without inducing a lasting price recovery [6].
The Saudis and their neighbors instead dramatically increased their
production inanapparentbid todriveprices furtherdownand force
high-cost suppliers out of the market.
The inability of OPEC to agree to production cuts triggered a
battle for market share, both inside and outside the cartel (see
Fig. 1). OPEC’s laissez-faire oil policy prompted the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to observe, quite remarkably, that ‘in 2016,
we are living in perhaps the first truly free oil market we have seen
since the pioneering days of the industry [7].’ An attempt to forge
a ‘production freeze’ (not to be conflated with a production cut)
between OPEC countries and Russia at a meeting in Doha in April
2016 utterly failed. The talks collapsed at the 11th hour after Saudi
Arabia refused to sign a deal without Iran, which in turn did not
want to participate in a production freeze, arguing it needed to
recapture market share lost while it was under international sanc-
tions. Another attempt in September 2016 seemedmore successful,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.10.005
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Fig. 1. Battling for market share: monthly output by selected producers.
Source: JODI: https://www.jodidata.org/oil/, consulted on October 11, 2016.
with OPEC countries agreeing to adopt a production target ‘rang-
ing between 32.5 and 33.0mb/d [8]’. While OPEC may appear to
reassert itself with this deal, observers remained skeptical whether
(i) OPEC countries would actually follow through on this commit-
ment; and (ii) whether such a production cut could have major
knock-on effects on global prices, in light of the large inventory
overhang that needs to be cleared first.
Yet, thebattle formarket share is onlyhalf the story.With its vast
and cheap oil reserves, Saudi Arabia has long beenwary of ‘demand
destruction’ and wants to keep oil consumers hooked to oil, as
was illustrated in a US Department of State cable that was made
public by Wikileaks. ‘Saudi officials are very concerned that a cli-
mate change treatywould significantly reduce their income,’ James
Smith, the U.S. ambassador to Riyadh,wrote in a 2010memo toU.S.
Energy Secretary Steven Chu. ‘Effectively, peak oil arguments have
been replacedbypeakdemand.’ It thus seems reasonable to assume
that for Saudi officials, low oil prices also serve as a hedge against
rising tide of fuel economy, biofuels, electric vehicles, natural gas
vehicles, advances in energy storage, et cetera.
Two years onwards, OPEC’s market share strategy has done lit-
tle to lift oil prices—the oil price has been stuck for months in a
$40–$50 price-per-barrel band. To make matters worse, OPEC has
in recent years been riven by internal quarrels and rifts, includ-
ing proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran in both Yemen and
Syria. Several OPEC countries are facing domestic political insta-
bility, particularly Libya (which, after Gaddafi, has been riven by
conflict between East and West) [9], Venezuela (which has seen a
series of mass protests, political demonstrations, and civil insur-
rection since 2014), and Nigeria (where repeated acts of sabotage
by a militant group called the ‘Niger Delta Avengers’ has taken the
country’s oil production near 30-year lows) [10]. Moreover, Saudi
Arabia, still the cartel’s informal leader, has sacked its long-serving
oilministerAli al-Naimi inMay2016andannouncedaplan (dubbed
‘Vision 2030’) to wean its economy off from oil.
Some analysts suggest that the cartel’s failure to reach a united
position ‘is not merely a sign that its influence is at a cyclical low
ebb, but rather a portent of a more structural shift into irrelevance
[11].’ By announcing a national plan to wean the kingdom’s econ-
omy off oil revenue, Saudi Arabia is said to ‘sounding the group’s
death knell.’ Evenwithin the organization itself, the view is gaining
root that the club is in decay. At the May 2016 OPEC board of gov-
ernors meeting in Vienna, a representative from a ‘non-Gulf Arab
country’ pronounced OPEC dead [12]. Predictions of OPEC’s demise
have a long history, of course, and so far they have always proven to
be exaggerated [13]. Yet, some analysts, such as EdMorse from the
investment bank Citigroup, maintain that ‘this time around might
well be different [14],’ because the shale revolution has heralded a
‘new oil order [15].’
This perspective argues that OPEC does indeed face a dramat-
ically altered external environment, brought about by three main
trends: the fracking revolution and the risk of prolonged low oil
prices, tightening climate policies, and cheaper alternatives to oil
[16]. Yet, the claims about OPEC’s demise are misguided for four
reasons. First, OPEC never was a powerful cartel anyway—in fact,
it never actually was a cartel. Second, OPEC’s oil will still find a
market for years to come thanks to its favorable geology. Third,
international organizations rarely die and OPEC has demonstrated
a remarkable capacity to adapt to changing circumstances over its
lifetime. Finally, despite its lack of action and cohesiveness, OPEC
still provides many useful functions to its member states.
2. A perfect storm: the geopolitics of oil abundance
The conventional view of energy geopolitics has long been
underpinned by the expectation that global demand for oil will
continue to grow unabatedly. The geopolitics of energy used to be
framed as a struggle for access to scarce oil and gas reserves—an
image that is still often reproduced in the media. Soaring energy
demand from rising economies and depletion of existing fields
was thought to intensify the scramble, which would in turn inflate
the power of OPEC and other big producers such as Russia [17].
Since the 2000s, when oil prices began to climb, OPEC comfortably
believed that the oil-constrained world had arrived and its oil was
more valuable under the ground than out in the market [18].
That commonwisdomhas now changed. The new geopolitics of
energy is characterized by abundance rather than scarcity, even at
lowprices. In fact,OPECcountriesmightnotbeable toburn through
all of their fossil fuel reserves due to climate change regulation.
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Box 1: Past attempts by oil producers to stabilize pro-
duction and prices.
Source: Kemp [20].
Name Date/Period
Oil Creek Association 1861
Petroleum Producers Association of Pennsylvania 1869
Standard Oil 19870s–1910s
Achnacarry/As-Is Agreement 1928
Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement 1944
Seven Sisters 1940s–1970s
Texas Railroad Commission 1940s–1970s
OPEC 1960s–today
Key trends in efficiency, fuel-switching and market saturation are
pointing into the direction of a demandpeak for oil instead of a sup-
ply peak. Oil producers are coming to realize that oil in the ground
is not like ‘money in the bank’ but that these resourcesmight some-
day be less valuable than oil produced and sold in the short term
[18]. The challenge of oil producers thus once more boils down to
the question of ‘how to organize scarcity in the face of prodigious
abundance [19]’, as it has so many times before (see Box 1).
2.1. Abundant reserves
The first crack in this conventional view of energy geopolitics
arose due to the recent shale and fracking revolution, which has
unlocked large new oil and gas deposits for commercial extrac-
tion. To be sure, tight oil and shale gas production comes at a
price compared to conventional extraction, both in terms of higher
exploration and production cost, a lower energy return on invest-
ment (EROI), and grave environmental and social risks. These costs
and externalities, though, have not prevented the rapid and vast
boom of the shale gas and tight oil industry in the United States,
which alone added almost 4mb/d of oil to the world’s oil produc-
tion between 2007 and 2015 (see Fig. 1). The IEA expects a number
of countries to follow into the footsteps of the United States, with
China likely in the vanguard, though it will take a few more years
before their efforts to tap shale gas and tight oil deposits at a large
scale will bear fruit [21].
There are other emerging sources of supply, next to shale oil,
including biofuels, oil sands, deepwater deposits, and growing
conventional production fromcountries like Iraq,whichmight sub-
stantially increase the global reserve base. Coupled with OPEC’s
rising internal demand and stagnant or even falling upstream
capacity, the group’s share of the export market might be eroded
over time [22]. But the advent of the shale and tight oil industry
stands out for three reasons [23].
First, by unlocking vast resources that had long been deemed
uneconomical, the fracking technology has dispelled ‘peak oil’ wor-
ries just as rising climate concerns have begun to cast doubt on the
long-term outlook for oil demand growth. This has fueled specula-
tion that a huge ‘carbonbubble’ is in themaking, that large amounts
of oil would have to ‘stay in the ground’, and that some of OPEC’s
resources might end up being ‘stranded assets’. This might change
the revenue-maximizing strategy of low-cost producers like Saudi
Arabia and give them an incentive to speed up, rather than slow
down, oil extraction.
Second, the shale revolution accelerates the eastward migra-
tion of the global oil market, whereby the center of gravity of
oil consumption, and hence oil trade flows, are decidedly shift-
ing to the so-called ‘East of Suez’ region. That leaves oil exporters
competing with each other for an increasingly concentrated Asian
market, which is itself dominated by supergiant Chinese oil trading
companies with considerable market power. This situation pro-
vides another deterrent for OPEC to implement production cuts.
Last but not least, what stands at the center of the shale oil rev-
olution is that it has changed the cost curve and elasticity of oil
supply. The fracking industry operates on a much shorter invest-
ment cycle than the conventional oil industry: upfront costs are
relatively low, decline rates are steep, lead times andpayback times
are short. There is no real exploration process to speak of because
the location and broad characteristics of the main plays are well
known. The time from an investment decision to actual produc-
tion is measured in months, rather than years, making the tight oil
industry far more nimble and responsive to price signals [24].
While this does not necessarily mean that the tight oil industry
can now operate as the new ‘swing producer’, it is very likely that
the fracking industry will keep a lid on a possible price rebound.
After a period of resilience thanks to improvements in productivity
and drilling efficiency, shale oil has been the first respondent to the
price decline, with production losses projected for 2016 estimated
at around 900,000 barrels per day year-on-year [25]. It may again
be the first respondent on the way up, but that depends on the
industry’s continued access to capital and labor, which is uncertain
[26]. To the extent that this happens, shale might simply mitigate
the volatility problem that has plagued oil markets for so long,
which might not necessarily be a bad thing for low-cost produc-
ers in OPEC. But the smoothening effect of unconventional oil on
the price curve might be detrimental for high-cost producers as it
will exert downward pressure on long-term global crude oil prices.
2.2. Shrinking demand
At thedemandside, theParisAgreement concluded inDecember
2015 might prove to be a game-changer. Even though the text of
the Agreement nowhere mentions the words ‘oil’, ‘gas’, ‘energy’,
‘fossil fuels’ or even ‘carbon’, the deal effectively implies a complete
overhaul of the world’s energy mix. By agreeing on the political
goal of limiting averageglobal surface temperature increase to ‘well
below’ 2 ◦C above preindustrial levels and even try to keep it below
1.5 ◦C, the Paris Agreement boils down to a commitment to phase
out fossil fuels entirely before the end of the century.
More specifically, the IPCC’s latest Synthesis Report finds that, to
have a likely (>66%) chance of limiting warming to 2 ◦C, net global
carbon emissions will need to be reduced to zero by around 2065
(see Table 1). Such carbon neutrality does not imply zero emissions
in all sectors. Remaining emissions in a certain country or sector
(e.g., energy) could be compensated by CO2 removals achieved by
afforestation and reforestation (in UNFCCC speak this is known as
LULUCF: the uptake of CO2 due to human activities in the ‘land
use, land-use change, and forestry sector’) or negative emissions
like bioenergy in combination with CO2 capture and permanent
geological storage (also known as BECCS) [27]. If the carbon budget
is overspent, such negative global emissions could in theory also
make up for the overspending [28].
Under a scenario where fossil fuel use is reduced to limit global
warming to 2 ◦C, oil will probably be phased out slower than coal
which is far more polluting and has more substitutes. Yet, oil will
certainly not be able to expand at the same pace as it used to. The
IEA’s latest 450 scenario, which is consistent with a 50% chance
of less than 2 ◦C of global warming, projects global oil demand to
reach a peak of 93.7 million b/d in 2020 after which it falls fall to
74.1 million b/d by 2040. This would imply that the oil industry’s
decades-old expansionwould come to ahalt andenter apermanent
decline, implying that the oil would become an ex-growth sector.
This could trigger a ‘race to sell oil’ among petrostates [30], among
other strategies (see Table 2).
McGlade and Ekins have calculated that, globally, a third of oil
reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80% of current coal reserves
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Table 1
Deadline to phase out energy-related emissions in 1.5 and 2◦ scenarios.
Global temperature goala Remaining carbon budgetb Timing of reaching net zero levelsc
CO2 from energy and industry Global total CO2 Kyoto-GHGs
2 ◦C,
medium chance
(50%–66%)
1140 2080 2070 2100
2 ◦C,
likely chance (>66%)
790 2065 2065 2090
1.5 ◦C,
medium chance
(50%–66%)
365 2055 2055 2080
Source: Rogelj et al. [29].
a To be reached in 2100, relative to pre-industrial levels. Rounded to nearest 5 GtCO2 .
b Median estimate of cumulative CO2 emissions from 2011 to 2100 (GtCO2).
c Median estimate, rounded to nearest 5 year.
Table 2
Strategic options of major oil exporters in a carbon-constrained world.
Strategy Description Recent examples
Quota agreements Exporters jointly agree on production quota to restrict output,
keep oil prices high, and thus preserve oil rents in the face of
falling demand.
Attempts in April and September 2016 to ‘freeze’ production by a
number of major oil exporters, both from OPEC and non-OPEC
(Russia).
Price wars Exporters engage in competitive price undercuts to gain market
share and sell as much oil as possible before oil assets become
stranded due to climate regulation.
By pumping at record levels, OPEC and non-OPEC (mainly US tight
oil) producers are currently said to be engaged in a price war.
Efficiency Exporters attempt to preserve rents by becoming more efficient in
how they produce petroleum and spend their oil revenues.
Several OPEC countries have recently reformed domestic fuel
subsidies. Saudi Arabia is preparing an IPO of parts of Saudi
Aramco.
Compensation Exporters strive for monetary compensation within the UNFCCC
process for their envisaged loss in oil revenues.
In 2007, Ecuador proposed to leave nearly 900 million barrels of oil
underground in the Yasuni National Park if the international
community would pay 50% of the value of the reserves for the
avoided emissions to a trust fund. In 2013, the initiative was
abandoned for lack of sufficient pledges.
Diversification Exporters diversify their national economies to become less
dependent on the oil sector.
Saudi Arabia has announced ‘Vision 2030′—a plan to limit the
country’s dependence on oil revenues.
Source: Van de Graaf and Verbruggen [31].
Table 3
Reserves unburnable before 2050 in a 2 ◦C scenario with CCS.
Oil Gas Coal
Africa 21% 33% 85%
Canada 74% 24% 75%
China and India 25% 63% 66%
FSU 18% 50% 94%
CSA 39% 53% 51%
Europe 20% 11% 78%
Middle East 38% 61% 99%
OECD Pacific 37% 56% 93%
ODA 9% 24% 34%
US 6% 4% 92%
Global 33% 49% 82%
Source: McGlade and Ekins [32].
Notes: FSU, the former Soviet Union countries; CSA, Central and South America;
ODA, Other developing Asian countries; OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Bold value indicates the global average.
should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to have a better-
than-even chance of meeting the target of 2 ◦C. These ‘unburnable
reserves’ do not decrease verymuch in a scenario with widespread
deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS). For example, the
amount of ‘unburnable’ oil inches slightly downwards from 35% to
33% of all reserves if CCS is widely deployed. The modest effect of
CCS is due to the fact that CCSwill take decades to scale up globally,
the techniquemight not bemore cost-effective than renewables or
nuclear and it is not entirely carbon-free. Table 3 depicts the shares
of fossil fuel reserves that should be kept under the ground to have
amedium chance of limitingwarming to 2 ◦C in a scenariowith CCS
deployment.
Admittedly, there are good reasons tobe skeptical about theout-
come of COP21. Nobody knowswhat ‘well below2 ◦C’ reallymeans,
shipping and aviation are not included in the Paris Agreement, and
current national pledges – if they are met – will likely set us on
a path of 2.7–3.7 ◦C of global warming by 2100 [33]. The Agree-
ment does contain a commitment to renewand review the national
pledges every five years, but it remains to be seenwhether this will
lead to a ‘virtuous cycle’ of strengtheningmitigation ambition over
time that is capable of closing the emissions gap.
Even if the 2 ◦C goal is not met, there are significant drivers that
could lead to a peak in global oil demand, including lower economic
growth (especially in emergingmarkets), the falling cost of renew-
ables and electricity storage, the emergence of prosumers with
a keen interest in electric vehicles, the spread of more stringent
policies to mitigate air pollution or water stress, and the growing
decoupling between oil consumption and economic growth due to
greater efficiency [34]. In short, the writing is on the wall that oil
will never again grow at its historic rates. As Fig. 2 shows, in only
9 of the past 50 years did the global demand for oil contract. In all
other years it grew, quite often bymore than 3% on an annual basis.
Over thewhole period (1966–2015), the compound annual average
growth rate of oil demand was 1.94%. Throughout all of the IEA’s
scenarios (2013–2040), this rate will slow down to 0.88% (Current
Policies Scenario), 0.43% (New Policies Scenario), or even −0.85%
(450 Scenario) [35].
3. Can OPEC cope with these challenges?
In light of these challenges, observers have declared OPEC dead
as a cartel. There are fourmajor reasonswhy this view ismisguided.
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Fig. 2. Growth in global oil demand is slowing.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2016.
First, OPEC never reallywas a cartel, let alone an omnipotent one. It
only began to enact production targets since 1982 and, even then,
it was not very successful. Despite OPEC’s efforts to function as a
cartel, the oil price plummeted in the first half of the 1980s. Most,
if not all OPEC countries cheated on their allocated production tar-
gets until Saudi Arabia’s patience was exhausted and the Kingdom
decided to flood themarket in 1986, in order to regainmarket share
and punish the cheaters [6]. Colgan finds that the cartel has over-
produced a staggering 96% of the time in the period 1982–2009
[36].
Second, OPEC’s reserves are not stranded yet. OPEC still com-
mands the largest conventional oil reserves. Especially the Gulf
members of OPEC have very low production costs. If oil is stranded
due to climate policies, it will most likely be the most expensive,
risky and polluting fields, such as the Arctic, the ultra-deepwater
fields, and the tar sands. Cherp et al. find that a peak in oil demand
due to climate policies could even lead to a higher concentra-
tion of production in the hands of those states holding the largest
conventional oil reserves, which are generally cheaper and less
carbon-intensive [37].
Third, OPEC has demonstrated a remarkable flexibility and
resilience during its lifetime. As mentioned, it was not created as a
price cartel. Supply management only became a focus for the orga-
nization in the 1980s. The organization has survived various price
crashes, as well as the emergence of the North Sea in the 1970s,
Alaska in the 1980s, offshore oil production in the 1990s and biofu-
els in the 2000s—all of which were seen as existential threats [38].
Crucially, OPEC even hang together when the Saudis inflicted a lot
of pain on their fellow cartel members in the late 1980s. Most curi-
ously, OPEC oil ministers have continued to meet in Vienna even
when they were at war with each other, such as Iraq and Iran in
the 1980s (see Picture 1), Iraq and Kuwait in the 1990s, and Iran
and Saudi Arabia today (who are fighting proxy wars in Yemen and
Syria). As Antoine Halff, a former IEA oil market specialist, has con-
vincingly argued: ‘OPEC has changed and the idea that giving up on
supplymanagementmeans repudiatingwhat the group is all about
only focusesona limitedperiodof itshistoryandconfusesone stage
of policy with the essence of the group [39,51].’ In this flexibility
also lies the key to understand why OPEC is the only commodity
organization to have survived, whereas earlier commodity agree-
ments (including for tin, coffee, and natural rubber) have faltered
and disappeared.
Finally, OPECwill notwither away quickly because it still proves
useful for itsmember countries, as ismost vividly illustrated by the
Picture 1. Illustration of OPEC’s resilience: The Iranian deputy minister of
petroleum, left, sits next to a portrait of the nation’s oil minister who was captured
by Iraqi troops. The photo was placed on an empty chair during the OPEC meeting
of 1980.
Source: The Prescott Courier, Dec. 15, 1980.
recent re-entries of Indonesia and Gabon to the club. The re-entry
of Indonesia is most remarkable since the country has become a
net importer. Yet, for its members, OPEC is useful as a forum to
share information, as a forum for deliberation, and most notably,
a source of prestige. There is a persistent rational myth that OPEC
is a powerful cartel [36]. International media are obsessed with
OPEC meetings, outcomes and declarations, even if the group’s
(long-term) impact on oil prices is heavily disputed. Intermittent
attempts in theUS to put in place a bill against OPECmarketmanip-
ulation are testimony to the rational myth that OPEC is almighty.
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4. How could OPEC adapt?
OPEC’s endurance amidst the tectonic changes that have taken
place in the global petroleummarket has been called an ‘enigma of
world politics’, and the organization itself has been referred to as
a ‘striking anachronism [22]’. Students of international relations
know however that international organizations rarely die [40].
Robert Keohane famously stated that international institutions are
‘easier to maintain than to construct [41].’ There are many exam-
ples of international organizations that have outlived their original
mandate. Think of NATO’s resilience after the end of the Cold War
[42], theWorld Bank’s endurance after the postwar reconstruction
of Europe, or the Bank for International Settlements surviving the
Great Depression and the SecondWorldWar [43]. In the same vein,
it is conceivable that OPEC survives the transition to a post-carbon
society, as long as it finds a niche for itself that proves valuable to
its member states.
Other international energy organizations such as the IEA have
been busy for years to adapt to major shifts in the global energy
landscape [44]. The IEA has been quite successful in this regard,
and is touted as a model for the reform of other global institu-
tions [45]. Yet, other international energy bodies have been much
slower to adapt and some even stick around without being very
meaningful. A case in point is the Energy Charter Treaty, which
has been in complete disarray since Russia’s formal withdrawal
in 2009, despite recent attempts to reinvigorate the organization
[46]. The key question thus becomes whether OPEC countries will
engage in a far-reaching examination of the organization’s mission
and toolbox, or whether the club will sink into oblivion. A system-
atic account of the history of global energy governance has shown
that oil exporters might engage in institutional innovation when
they are dissatisfied with the level of their oil revenues [47]. The
current low oil prices might thus provide a window of opportunity
to reform OPEC.
Over the short to medium term, OPEC might continue to serve
as a forum to facilitate attempts at managing oil supply. For all the
doubts expressed about it, the recent Algiers signals that there still
exists a willingness to intervene and stabilize oil markets in spite
of the rhetoric that the oil market should now manage itself.
Toward the longer term,as theworld shifts away tocleaner fuels,
OPEC could provide a valuable framework for exchanging critical
information among member states about the implications of this
shift. This could be technical cooperation on technologies such as
CCS, which may play their role in the transition and prove to be
another source of income for OPEC countries out of their depleted
oil and gas wells. But it could also entail the sharing of best prac-
tices of how to make a national economy less dependent on the
revenues from the foreign sales of crude. Despite many attempts
to diversify petro-economies, there are only scant examples of suc-
cess (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia and Dubai), and it can be questioned
whether these models can be replicated [31]. OPEC’s Secretariat
could become an information clearing-house to share information
on what works and what does not in particular circumstances.
5. Implications for research
The link between fossil fuels and climate change is amuch over-
looked subject of study. Energy and climate change have long been
two distinct policy silos, each with its own set of epistemic com-
munities, bureaucrats, experts, and advocacy networks. Oil traders
have long tended to focus on OPECmeetings and ignore the UN cli-
mateprocess,while climatewonkshave typically turnedablindeye
to OPEC meetings. This was most vividly illustrated in December
2015, when few observers and media reports noted the linkages
between the simultaneous meetings in Vienna (OPEC) and in Paris
(COP21). This perspective argues that the mutual neglect between
climate and energy is no longer tenable, and it identifies three
promising avenues for further research.
First, the geopolitics of oil and climate change are intimately
interconnected, but the interconnections are not well understood.
The conventional view of the geopolitics of energy is that it is all
about ‘scarcity’ and ‘access to fields’. This dominant view is often
reproduced in media reports about recent developments in the
South China Sea, the Mediterranean or the Artic, which are framed
as ‘energy battles’. In a carbon-constrainedworld, the geopolitics of
energywill revolvearound ‘abundance’ and ‘access tomarkets’ [52].
The geopolitical implications of ‘stranded assets’ and of the shift to
renewables merit more attention than they have so far received
[48].
A second key research question concerns the adaptation ofOPEC
as an organization to the shifts in its external environment. OPEC’s
recent, bumpy history raises many interesting research ques-
tions. Why have former members Indonesia and Gabon decided
to re-enter the organization? Why did OPEC and Russia reach an
agreement in September 2016 to freeze production in spite of the
failed talks in April? Will the oil producers follow through on their
agreement and, if so, can they turn the tides of low oil prices? Can
OPEC play a constructive role in global energy and climate gover-
nance, for example in a supply-side climate policy scheme [49], or
will it mainly act as a regime spoiler [50]?
A third avenue focuses on how the petrostates within OPEC
could diversify their economies. ‘Sowing the oil’ to diversify the
economy has been a longstanding goal for many oil exporters who
want to escape the ailments of the resource curse, or face a declin-
ing resource base. Yet, there are only a few successful examples of
suchdiversification andquestions can be raised overwhether these
examples constitute ‘models’ that can be replicated by others. A
particularly important question in this regard iswhether Saudi Ara-
bia’s plan to diversify the national economy is likely to be sustained
and the conditions under which it can be successful.
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